AKP Phnom Penh, September 1, 2026 --

In a Facebook message posted on Aug. 31, Cambodian Minister of Information H.E. Neth Pheaktra has stressed that the Joint Statement of Dec. 27, 2025, which established ceasefire arrangements between Cambodia and Thailand, is not a boundary treaty and cannot be used to alter the internationally recognised border.

The full message reads as follows:

“A Ceasefire Cannot Draw a New Border: The Joint Statement of 27 December 2025 Is Not a Boundary Treaty

The remarks made by Lieutenant General Prapas Sonjaidee, Director of Thailand’s Joint Information Centre (JIC), as reported by The Nation Thailand on 31 August 2026-asserting that troops should remain in the positions agreed upon and that Thailand has never altered conditions on the ground, purportedly on the basis of the Joint Statement of 27 December 2025-are fundamentally inconsistent with the actual substance and purpose of that Joint Statement, with international law, and with the facts and evidence on the ground.

Such an interpretation risks misleading domestic and international public opinion by creating the false impression that Cambodia agreed to allow Thai forces to remain deployed on territory falling within Cambodia’s lawful sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The fact is that the Joint Statement of 27 December 2025, which established the ceasefire arrangements, and in particular its Paragraph 2, is not a boundary treaty and cannot be construed as having the legal effect of superseding the 1:200,000 map series forming an important part of the body of instruments and documentation associated with the Franco-Siamese boundary settlement.

These maps constitute important legal and historical evidence concerning the delimitation of the boundary. They cannot be displaced by a temporary military arrangement designed to stop hostilities.

Thailand therefore cannot invoke the Joint Statement as a legal basis for maintaining control over Cambodian territory or for creating a fait accompli through the installation of barbed wire, deployment of shipping containers, construction of bunkers and trenches, road building and land clearance, demolition of civilian homes and religious structures, erection of statues, raising of national flags, or other unilateral activities on Cambodian territory.

Such actions are incompatible with the applicable international legal framework, the relevant 1:200,000 maps, the Franco-Siamese treaties and conventions, the record of the JBC meeting in Chanthaburi of 22 October 2025, relevant bilateral arrangements, and the Joint Statement of 27 December 2025 itself.

The maps originating from the Franco-Siamese boundary process form part of the historical and legal framework relevant to the boundary between Cambodia and Thailand. In this context, maps prepared unilaterally by one side-including military map series such as L7017, L7018, or other unilateral cartographic products-cannot, by themselves, modify or replace a boundary arising from legal instruments and arrangements binding upon both parties.

The maps produced through the Franco-Siamese boundary process were also of particular significance in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear. In its 1962 Judgment and its 2013 Judgment on interpretation, the Court addressed the legal consequences relating to the Temple and the surrounding area falling within the scope of those judgments, including Thailand’s obligation to withdraw its military, police or other guards or keepers from Cambodian territory as determined by the Court.

It is important, however, to be precise: the 1962 and 2013 ICJ Judgments concerned the Temple of Preah Vihear and the area falling within the scope of those judgments; they should not be construed as having delimited the entire Cambodia–Thailand boundary.

Indeed, it is precisely because the Joint Statement of 27 December 2025 is not a boundary treaty that both sides accorded high priority to the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) and the relevant technical mechanisms operating under it. These mechanisms remain essential for addressing boundary-related matters and reducing tensions between the two countries.

The preambular provisions of the Joint Statement underscore the importance of achieving a definitive resolution of boundary issues. Paragraphs 3 and 4 further reflect the parties’ agreement to advance JBC meetings, technical discussions and the deployment of joint survey teams to relevant areas on the ground, with their safety facilitated through mine-clearance activities conducted within the relevant JBC framework.

Accelerating the work of the JBC is intended to address outstanding boundary-demarcation issues on the ground, facilitate the safe return of displaced Cambodian civilians to their homes, and contribute to lasting peace and stability along the Cambodia–Thailand border.

Accordingly, isolating Paragraph 2 from the rest of the Joint Statement and interpreting it as conferring territorial rights on the basis of military positions fundamentally distorts the object and purpose of the agreement.

The Joint Statement is, in essence, a ceasefire and de-escalation arrangement. It is not a boundary treaty, nor does it authorize Thai forces to establish sovereignty, acquire territorial rights, or undertake activities infringing upon Cambodia’s sovereignty merely by remaining in particular military positions.

Put differently, maintaining military positions for the purpose of stopping hostilities is a temporary security arrangement. It does not constitute recognition of sovereignty, recognition of a boundary, or the transfer of title to territory.

Paragraph 2 therefore cannot reasonably be interpreted as authorizing one party to use a ceasefire arrangement to consolidate military control over territory claimed by the other party. Any boundary-related interpretation must be considered within the broader applicable legal framework, including the Franco-Siamese treaties and conventions, the relevant 1:200,000 maps, and subsequent bilateral instruments and mechanisms, including the 2000 Memorandum of Understanding and the 2003 Terms of Reference.

Cambodia has never agreed that Thai forces may use the ceasefire arrangement as authorization to deploy, consolidate their presence, or undertake unlawful activities on Cambodian territory. A temporary cessation of hostilities cannot be transformed into a source of territorial title.

Thailand should therefore demonstrate genuine commitment and good faith by fully implementing the Joint Statement and translating its commitments into concrete conduct on the ground, rather than relying on selective interpretations that may serve a public narrative but are inconsistent with the purpose of the ceasefire arrangement.

Military positions may be frozen to stop the shooting, but borders are neither frozen nor redrawn according to where troops happen to stand.

A ceasefire stops the shooting. It does not draw a new map.”

AKP